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1. INTRODUCTION
The sixteen years after the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, so-called the Dayton (Peace) Agreement, saw no recurrence of violent 
conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Under the international supervision 
exercised by the High Representative and EU Special Representative supported by the 
Office of the High Representative (OHR), BiH endeavours to pursue the dual goals of 
post-conflict state building and post-socialist economic transition. 
  BiH has been in a process of EU accession since 2000 when the European Council 
stated that BiH, among others in the Western Balkan region, were potential candidates 
for EU membership. The accession countries are required to complete a variety of 
institutional reforms as the condition to proceed to the EU entrance. One of the 
important steps for the accession countries to realise the membership is a signature of 
The development of EU accession processes in the Western Balkan states 
would alter Bosnia’s reluctance to pursue tough reforms, otherwise the 
economy loses a good chance to achieve sustainable development, if not 
to survive. As the neighbouring countries’ EU accessions become a matter 
of reality and hence EU boundary will emerge just in front of Bosnia, 
the time is running out to let the Bosnian exports comply with various 
EU standards. This is not a mere technical issue in trade facilitation, 
but has significant implications to domestic political process. However, 
there is a risk of moral hazard in Bosnia to pursue reforms. To avoid the 
risk of ‘waiting game’ between Brussels and Sarajevo, a more proactive 
interventionist approach may want to be considered for the EU. 
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Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) by which a country can enjoy tariff-
free access to EU markets and financial and technical assistance by the EU but with 
reform obligations (although the reforms themselves contribute to strengthening the 
country’s capacity). By satisfying the provisions of SAA, a country is formally 
granted a ‘candidate status’ by Brussels.
  While other Balkan countries went through the process, BiH finally signed the SAA 
in June 2008—after a compromise of the EU in an important reform condition on the 
one hand and a series of setbacks in which political divisions between the three ethnic 
groups have delayed the required reforms to be pursued on the other. The latter has 
made BiH the last runner of the accession race.
  The international community believed that BiH’s nationalist politics would 
progressively fade away and that a more ‘Western-style’ political system would 
develop to replace them. However, the political life is still led by three nationalist 
parties. The two entities of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosniac and 
Croats) and the Republika Srpska (Serbs) still fear each other; and this feeling 
constitutes one of the main obstacles to the creation and consolidation of common 
institutions and a state (Juncos 2005). The division and tensions between the three 
have had significant negative implications to BiH’s post-conflict rehabilitation and 
longer term sustainable development.
  This article was initially motivated by the following questions. The EU has been 
promoting political and economic reforms in counterpart countries leveraged by 
granting preferential access to its lucrative market. In BiH context, to maintain and 
strengthen the stability of the Western Balkan region is of an important security issue 
for the existing EU members. Hence it is legitimate for the EU to be involved in BiH’s 
post-conflict rehabilitation. However, the recent worldwide financial crisis triggered 
by the 2008 Lehman shock and Eurozone debt crisis may have impacts on Brussels’ 
external policies. For BiH side, there might also be skepticism about the value of a 
EU membership at the expense of the politically costly reforms—that ‘how much 
does a EU membership give us tangible (and shorter term) benefits?’ and that ‘do we 
really have to meet the EU condition in full, while Brussels may concede again in 
future negotiation stages? 
  In short, this article is concerned about the policy changes in Brussels and Sarajevo 
under the recent (and ongoing) worldwide economic crisis and the 2008 signature of 
the SAA, if any, and the implications thereof to the latter’s development. For this 
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purpose, this article examines the three hypotheses. First, the EU might have become 
reluctant to promote BiH's accession process due to the expected burden (not merely 
financial assistance to BiH but unexpected problems implied by the Greek sovereign 
debt crisis) as well as to the twin fatigues of ‘accession fatigue’ (MacDonald and 
Buckley 2011)—i) the admission of the twelve new members in 2004 and 2007 is 
enough and ii) ‘Bosnia fatigue’, Brussels’ irritation at the series of non-compliance 
with the EU’s conditions. Second, the EU economic crisis may discourage BiH’s 
reform efforts, as there is little space for politicians to pursue difficult reforms at the 
expense of constituency’s support. Third, hence the SAA signature brings about 
limited impacts, if not little, on BiH’s reform efforts towards a sustainable economy, 
let alone an EU membership. 
  This article is organised as follows. Section 2 overviews the current settings and 
issues with particular focus on BiH economic aspects. Section 3 examines BiH’s EU 
accession process. After reviewing the trajectory in the last fifteen years, the EU’s 
approach to BiH and the policies behind it are examined. Subsequently section 4 
investigates the benefits and costs as well as the implications of the SAA to BiH, and 
section 5 concludes this article. 
  Although the domestic political process in BiH has played a primary role in the 
country’s disappointing records of reform efforts and EU accession process, it is not 
within the scope of this article to provide an account of the BiH politics—which the 
literature has already had profound analyses.
2. ISSUES IN BOSNIA’S ECONOMY
In 2010, the economic size (gross domestic product: GDP) of BiH was about USD 8.2 
billion with GDP per capita of over USD 2,000 (or USD 4,500 at current price) (Table 
1). Service sectors (e.g. retail trade, public administration and financial services, 
among others) accounts for more than 60 percent of total value added. The income 
level and the share of services in the economy suggest that the country is categorised 
as a middle income economy. Nevertheless, the industrial base is weak (largely due to 
the destruction by the war and the falter in post-socialist transition) and consisted of 
few number of large scale factories in, namely, metal sector and small and medium 
scale enterprises with lower technological levels. World Bank (2011b: 2) points out 
that BiH is ‘a predominantly rural country… and agriculture production represents a 
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great area of potential for economic growth and employment’ to address the high rate 
of unemployment (27 percent). The exports account for 11 percent of GDP in which 
manufacturing sectors—mainly footwear in the ‘Miscellaneous manufactured articles’ 
and base metals (aluminium, iron and steel) in ‘Manufactured goods’ of Table 2—are 
the main contributors. The economy has been running trade deficits (about 20 percent 
of GDP) which are financed by foreign credits (ibid.). 
  The impacts of the global economic and financial crisis were significant. According 
to the database of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2011), 
BiH received foreign direct investment (FDI) of USD 63 millions in 2010 and saw a 
Table 1. BiH selected economic indicators: 2005-2010
05 06 07 08 09 10
GDP (a) (b) 7 013 7 447 7 957 8 388 8 128 8 193
GDP growth (%) 5.0 6.2 6.8 5.4 -3.1 0.8
GDP per capita (a) 1 854 1 969 2 106 2 223 2 157 2 179
Agriculture value added (c) 10.5 10.4 10.1 9.1 8.0 8.1
Industry value added (c) 25.1 24.7 27.4 28.5 28.1 28.8
  o/w Manufacturing (c) 11.3 11.9 14.2 14.1 12.9 13.2
Services value added (c) 64.4 64.9 62.6 62.4 63.9 63.1
Unemployment (%) n.a. 31.8 29.7 23.9 24.1 27.2
Export goods & services (c) 32.7 36.9 38.9 36.8 33.4 40.7
Export goods &services (d) 16.2 13.7 12.6 4.2 -3.5 11.3
Import goods &services (c) 73.9 67.1 73.3 69.4 58.0 62.3
Import goods &services (d) 7.9 -10.7 16.6 -1.9 -4.5 -3.9
Agricultural raw materials export (e) 9.8 8.3 8.2 6.8 6.2 n.a.
Manufactures export (e) 57.6 62.1 63.3 64.0 60.7 n.a.
FDI inflow (f) 613 766 2 080 932 246 63
Notes: (a) constant 2000 USD, (b) millions, (c) % of GDP, (d) annual % growth, (e) % of
 merchandise exports, (f) USD millions at current price
Source: World Development Indicators database (World Bank 2011c), Labour Force Survey 2010
 (Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2010), UNCTAD (2011) 
Table 2. BiH exports and imports by commodity: 2010
Km 000’s
SITC Rev.4 sections Exports % Imports %
Food & live animals 436.8 6.2 1 859.9 13.7
Beverages & tobacco 54.2 0.8 442.2 3.2
Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 906.2 12.8 475.0 3.5
Mineral fuels, lubricants & related materials 1 103.2 15.5 2 627.4 19.3
Animal & vegetable oils, fats & waxes 54.3 0.8 85.2 0.6
Chemicals & related products 366.2 5.2 1 642.1 12.1
Manufactured goods 1 821.4 25.7 2 670.4 19.6
Machinery & transport equipment 841.2 11.9 2 523.5 18.5
Misc. manufactured articles 1 511.4 21.3 1 290.0 9.5
Commodities & transactions, n.e.c 0.7 0.0 0.6 0.0
TOTAL 7 095.5 100.0 13 616.2 100.0
Source: Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina (2011)
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drastic decline from USD 2.1 billions in 2007, whilst the economy saw a negative 
growth of -3.1 percent in 2009 for the first time after the war. Above figures suggest 
that the FDI plays a major role both positively and negatively in the economic 
performance with such a narrow industrial base. MacDonald and Buckley (2011) 
suggest that the West Balkan countries, including BiH, are also among the countries 
that would suffer the most from the current Eurozone crisis. While central European 
states (e.g. Poland and the Czech Republic) have become manufacturing powerhouses 
exporting to Western Europe, much of the investment for Western Balkans tends to be 
directed into the sectors such as construction and tourism—which are susceptible to 
recession.
  The Global Competitiveness index in Table 3 ranks BiH 110 in the world, compared 
to 38, 66, 84 and 89 for FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, Croatia and Serbia, 
respectively. The GDP per capita, USD 4,525, is the lowest level among the counties, 
lagging far behind Croatia of USD 10,474. World Bank’s Doing Business ranking 
indicates that the business environment (i.e. a proxy for investment environment) of 
BiH is again the worst among the economies. As the export structure and its reliance 
on the EU market are similar to other economies (who are also EU accession countries 
and hence practical competitors), enormous efforts—such as upgrading in physical 
infrastructure, business environment and human capital as well as greater coherence 
Table 3. Regional comparison: 2009
BiH Croatia FYRMacedonia Montenegro Serbia
GDP (USD million) 17 042 63 034 9 221 4 141 42 984
Population (000’s) 3 767 4 432 2 042 624 7 320
GDP per capita (USD) 4 525 14 222 4 516 6 635 5 872
Merchandise exports (USD 
million) 3 954 10 474 2 692 414 8 345
EU share in total exports (%) 54 61 56 48 54
Export composition (%)
  Agricultural products 14 17 19 14 24
  Fuels &mining products 24 17 4 42 12
  Manufactures 59 66 51 42 62
Global competitiveness index 
ranking (2011-12) 100 76 79 60 95
Doing Business ranking (’10) 110 84 38 66 89
SAA/IA signature Jun 08 Oct 01 Apr 01 Oct 07 Apr 08
IA entry into force Jul 08 Mar 02 Jun 01 Jan 08 Feb 10
SAA entry into force ? Feb 05 Apr 04 May 10 2012 ?
Sources:  Eurostat; World Bank, World Development Indicators and Doing Business database; 
WTO statistics; World Economic Forum (2011)
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in administrative system, to name a few—are vital for BiH economy to survive, let 
alone to prosper in the long run.
  World Bank (2011b: 8) indicates that BiH needs to address three critical and 
interrelated development challenges: i) to sustain growth through improved 
competitiveness; ii) to reform public finances and institutions to improve service 
delivery and to make growth more inclusive and iii) to achieve the sustainable use of 
the natural resources by adapting to the climate change. Lack of progress in tackling 
the weakness in governance may undermine any progress on these challenges. BiH 
lacks coherent countrywide sectoral policies in the areas of energy, agriculture, 
education and transportation. The enterprise sector has been hit by an unfavourable 
regulatory environment and increased costs and risks due to ‘a large and complex 
public administration and layers of administrative approval authorities’ (World Bank 
2011a: 3). Corruption is said to be prevalent throughout the administrative agencies of 
state, entity and canton levels1. 
  There is a broad consensus that such weakness is ascribed to the deficiency in 
constitutional settings and administrative structure under the Dayton system2. 
Although the Dayton Agreement achieved the end of the deadly war, it also 
established the unwieldy, redundant constitutional structure—2 entities for 3 
constituent peoples of Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs, 5 presidents, 4 vice presidents, 13 
prime ministers, 14 parliaments, 147 ministers and 700 members of parliament, all of 
whom serve a population of just under four million people (Joseph and Hitchner 
2008). Some elements of this complexity were the result of necessary compromise to 
end the war. Nevertheless, the institutional inefficiency with complicate decision 
making, delayed reforms and political, ethnic stalemate have had significant 
implications to the country’s sixteen years of post-conflict trajectory, as represented in 
the disappointing performance above3. The EU’s wide range of conditionality for 
BiH’s EU accession is intended to address these problems. The following section 
examines the EU policies towards BiH, and explores the factors which have prevented 
the union’s efforts from functioning effectively. 
3. BOSNIA’S INTEGRATION FOR EUROPE
3.1. Stability Pact and Stabilisation and Association Process
The EU’s policy framework towards the Western Balkan region is represented by the 
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Stability Pact for Southeast Europe and the Stabilisation and Association Process 
(SAP); the both launched in June 1999. The Pact, being the leading strategy, and the 
SAP, as a complementary to the Pact, are seen as the cornerstone of the EU’s policy to 
promote stability and to facilitate closer association with the EU (World Bank 2007: 
78-9; Bechev 2006: 36)4. The Pact, consciously modelled on the post-1945 Marshall 
Plan, attempts to replace the previous reactive intervention policy with a 
comprehensive long term approach in order to address the common problems and 
prospects observed in the Western Balkans (Belloni 2009: 318-9). With the SAP—
launched in 1999 in response to the war in Kosovo and exclusively designed for the 
Western Balkan countries (i.e. BiH, FYR Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro and 
Kosovo)—the EU stated that countries were ‘potential candidates’ for EU 
membership5. 
  This has effectively given the countries credible prospect of EU membership, which 
would be the main motivator for reforms in the accession countries. Belloni (2009: 
319) points out that the shift from post-war stabilisation to an agenda of enlargement 
has provided two important advantages compared to the previous conﬂict 
management policies. First, addressing the situation in the Western Balkans as an 
enlargement issue rather than as a foreign policy issue has allowed European 
institutions and EU member states to reduce ambiguities and divergent preferences to, 
say, Bosniacs (against Serbs). Second, the promise of association and eventual 
membership has provided the EU with the opportunity to deploy the full strength of 
political conditionality (see below).
3.2. EU’s normative power and ‘Carrots and Sticks’ approach
The philosophy behind the SAP is underwritten by the concept of normative power by 
the means of persuasion and sympathy with EU values—such as commitment to the 
promotion of democracy, the rule of law and human rights. Juncos (2005: 97) argues 
that the EU describes its role as a norm promoter in the regional and international 
stage. A normative power would be characterised by the centrality of civilian 
instruments (e.g. economic, financial and diplomatic tools), by the use of force as the 
last resort, being possible and necessary in specific circumstances and by the 
promotion of multilateralism and regional cooperation through its external actions for 
achieving stability and security. In the SAP context, the EU has wielded considerable 
ideational power as a promoter of certain normative notions of appropriate state 
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behaviour with the carrots and sticks approach (i.e. both positive and negative 
conditionality in BiH’s reforms), leveraged by granting the preferential access to EU 
market and membership of the union (ibid.: 94; Bechev 2006: 28).
  In fact the conditions to pursue necessary but politically sensitive reforms (based on 
the shorter term calculations of the costs and beneﬁts, i.e. carrots and sticks, in which 
EU aspiring governments respond to the material incentives offered by the European 
institutions) and social learning (i.e. the longer term redeﬁnition of interests and 
identities of domestic players) are identified as the two main pathways of EU 
inﬂuence in the Western Balkans (Belloni 2009: 318-20; Coppieters et al. 2004). In 
this regard, an EU membership is considered to be the strongest incentive which 
would propel the process from stabilisation to association and to integration. The 
membership carrot should promote the required ‘internal changes that would bring 
BiH into line with the EU standards, both political and economic’ (Juncos 2005: 98; 
Kim 2005). The drawback of this conditions and carrots and sticks approach in BiH 
will be discussed below.
3.3. EU’s policy objectives and experience in the Western Balkan
A review of the EU policy objectives towards the Western Balkan region—with 
investing considerable political and economic resources aiming to enhance 
institutional building, economic reconstruction and regional cooperation in the 
countries—may be of help for the subsequent discussions. The primary goal is no 
doubt security and stabilisation of Europe. The European Commission identiﬁed the 
prospect of an EU membership as the ultimate conﬂict prevention strategy (European 
Communities 2005). The ‘academic near-consensus is that the Western Balkans’ 
greater involvement in European institutions is the necessary condition for 
stabilisation’ for Europe, and it constitutes the essential component of EU’s foreign 
policy (Belloni 2009: 313). Javier Solana (2001), then the EU's High Representative 
for Common Foreign and Security Policy, explicitly stated:
‘I make no apologies for concentrating on the Balkans. They are on our 
doorstep. The security of Europe depends on stability in the Balkans. They 
are also a test case for Europe’s enhanced Common Foreign and Security 
Policy. Nowhere more than in the Balkans is the EU expected to deliver’.
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  Besides the violent armed conflict, transnational and regional issues, such as 
organised crime, are also an important concern for Brussels in BiH context. Belloni 
2009) points out that once the Western Balkans is integrated into European 
institutions, the ﬁght against organised crime should be easier to tackle, since the 
region will be part of the EU’s law enforcement space. The promotion of the rule of 
law with functioning governments in the region (where hubs of organised crime, 
weapons smuggling, human trafficking, drug trafficking have existed) should reduce 
the threats which could easily spill over into the EU area. In fact one of the main 
priorities of the European Union Police Mission in BiH and European Union Force 
has been explained in this context6. The economic instruments, including preferential 
access to EU market and regional integration arrangement as well as considerable 
development assistance are placed under the objectives.
  With the advent of the Kosovo conflict, the new century saw Brussels’ shift in its 
policy for the Western Balkan region from an ‘external relations’ to the ‘enlargement’ 
segment with more engaged stance7. The 2000 Zagreb Summit between the Western 
Balkans and the EU declared that ‘the deepening of regional cooperation [would] go 
hand in hand with rapprochement with the EU’ (EC 2000). This declaration was 
materialised by the signature of the SAAs between the EU and Macedonia and Croatia 
in 2001. The following 2003 EU-Western Balkan Summit in Thessaloniki introduced 
a number of new instruments such as the European Partnerships, which made the SAP 
much closer to the accession process. In that sense, the summit was a move in the 
direction of the hub and spoke model in which Brussels sitting in the centre would 
make bilateral arrangements with each Balkan state. The Thessaloniki Agenda 
adopted at the summit seeks to balance the benefits between Brussels and the West 
Balkan countries by calling for reinforced cooperation in areas such as visa-free travel 
in the region and combating trans-border crime (EC 2003). 
  As in the Table 3, some countries are duly proceeding to the ladder towards EU 
membership. Croatia has closed the accession negotiation with the EU in June 2011, 
and the Accession Treaty has been signed in 9th December, leading to its scheduled 
EU membership in July 2013. For FYR Macedonia, the European Commission 
recommended the opening of accession negotiations to the union in October 2009, 
followed by visa liberalisation in EU area into force in December same year. 
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3.4. Dragging process in BiH
Table 4 reports the brief trajectory of BiH’s EU accession process. Currently BiH 
remains the slowest among the region in the EU integration process. Although the 
SAA and Interim Agreement on Trade and Trade-related Issues (IA) have been signed 
in 2008, the former’s entry into force is still on hold. 
  The country has disappointing records to meet the preconditions for every step in the 
accession process due to the lack of implementation of the required reforms. For 
example, the European Commission filed a Feasibility Study for the SAA in late 2003 
and outlined 16 priority tasks (i.e. conditions) for BiH to complete prior to opening 
SAA negotiations, mainly dealing with the capacity of state institutions (which was 
not completed in the end). Even after the European Commission considered it was 
prepared to launch negotiations for SAA based on a ‘positively’ evaluated feasibility 
study (thanks to Brussels’ political compromise), the failure to meet the preconditions 
Table 4. Key dates in BiH's path towards the EU
1995 - The Dayton Agreement reached (Nov), and formally signed in Paris (14 Dec).
1997 - EU establishes political & economic conditionality for development of bilateral relations.
1998 - EU/BiH Consultative Task Force established.
1999 - EU proposes the SAP for 5 countries of South-Eastern Europe (SEE), including BiH.
2000 - Feira European Council states all SAP countries are potential candidates for EU
   membership (Jun). 
 - Zagreb Summit launches SAP for 5 countries of SEE (Nov).
2003 - EC produces a feasibility study assessing BiH's capacity to implement a SAA. 
 - Thessaloniki European Council: SAP is confirmed as EU policy for Western Balkans.
   This confirms the EU perspective for the countries (Jun).
 - The European Union Police Mission (EUPM) is launched as the 1st European Security
   and Defence Police (ESDP) mission
2004 - The EU decides on the 1st European Partnership for BiH.
 - EUFOR ("Althea" operation) replaces NATO's SFOR mission.
2005 - SAA negotiations are officially opened in Sarajevo (25 Nov).
2006 - SAA negotiation concluded (Dec).
2007 - Miroslav Lajcak becomes new High Representative/EU Special Representative (1 Jul). 
 - Visa facilitation & readmission agreements with European Community signed (18 Sep). 
 - EU initials the SAA (4 Dec).
2008 - Visa facilitation and readmission agreements enter into force (1 Jan).
 - A new European partnership is adopted by the Council (Feb).
 - BiH signs Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) Framework Agreement (Feb).
 - Visa liberalisation dialogue launched (26 May).
 - EC presents roadmap setting out benchmarks for visa liberalization (5 Jun).
 - SAA and Interim Agreement on trade and trade-related issues signed (16 Jun).
 - Interim Agreement on trade and trade-related issues enters into force (1 Jul).
 - BiH & the EC sign the financing agreement for IPA 2007 National Programme (31 Jul).
2009 - Valentin Inzko becomes new High Representative/EU Special Representative (Mar).
2010 - EC adopted a proposal enabling citizens of Albania and BiH to travel to Schengen
   countries without needing a short term visa (May)
Source: EC (2010)
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listed in the document, notably the reform of police forces, has prevented BiH from 
proceeding the process (Bechev 2006).
  Besides the BiH government’s insufficient capacity, many delays in implementing 
reforms (in even purely technical issues) are explained in political context. Joseph and 
Hitchner (2008) argue that the shared aspiration, i.e. EU accession, is not fully 
neutral; rather, by encouraging more concentration of power at the state level, it 
inherently favours the Bosniac interest (sometimes shared by Croats) to make the 
central state operational at the expense of the RS side (as well as of Serb’s sentiment 
on war crimes issues). This facet was typically found in the late 2007 political crisis 
which was considered as the most serious one since the Dayton Agreement. The crisis 
was triggered by the Serbs’ refusal to accept procedural rules limiting ethnic vetoes 
and by a plan to create a single police force in the country. ‘Serbs feared that the ﬁrst 
proposal would marginalise them in state institutions, while the second one would 
lead to a loss of autonomy for their self-governing RS’ (Belloni 2009: 321). 
  While the carrot of an EU membership can be an incentive for Serb cooperation, but 
not a decisive one. Serb leaders have made it clear that ‘when the choice is between 
Brussels and RS, we choose RS’ (Joseph and Hitchner 2008: 4). This represents the 
persistent distrust among the entities; and the stalemate of reforms due to the political 
resistance is a textbook case of the Prisoner’s dilemma. Aybet (2010: 32) summarises 
that ‘considering the unique structure of the country—two entities, one of them 
comprising several cantons—and the international struggle to create functioning state-
level institutions while societal divisions still persist, it is a wonder that any progress 
at all has been made in the Bosnian case’.  
3.5. Critique on EU approach
Besides the domestic political divisions, the disappointing performance of BiH’s 
reform implementation can be also ascribed to the problems of EU side as well. First, 
in retrospect, the literature doubts the effectiveness of external pressure with the 
carrots of EU accession and sticks of the Bonn Power exerted by the OHR to enforce 
reforms. McMahon and Western (2009) contend that exposing the costs of 
obstructionism and corruption to all Bosnians would weaken political support for the 
ethnic nationalists and create a stronger domestic constituency for reforms and for the 
development of a functioning central state. In practice, however, the Bosnia’s sixteen 
year experience after the Dayton does not support this contention. 
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  Domm (2011: 59-60) argues that the international community tends to approach BiH 
as a political problem requiring a political solution to post-conflict stabilisation. This 
typically involves pressuring domestic political actors to implement key reforms and 
to resolve sensitive issues, where this has often led to confrontations and overt 
politicisation of reforms, ending up with the sustained support for nationalist political 
forces and decline in support for EU integration (as evidenced in the RS discontent 
with the international institutions such as the OHR and International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). In ethnically divided societies, electoral 
competition is not associated with the emergence of moderate parties heading for the 
centre ground, but rather with polarisation and a ‘race to the bottom’ amongst 
extremists (Vicente and Wantchekon 2009)8.
  External hands-on does not solely create antagonism, but dependency as well. 
Belloni (2009) and Domm (2011) point out that external imposition has led to a 
signiﬁcant free ride phenomena in BiH and prevented from developing effective 
partnerships between international and domestic actors and from fostering domestic 
(i.e. BiH’s) ownership to carry through with the difficult reforms9. In BiH, a de facto 
‘semi-protectorate’ under the authority of the Bonn Powers, local politicians have 
regularly maintained an intransigent attitude, avoided inter-ethnic cooperation and 
accommodation and then blamed international organisations for their own failure to 
make good on their electoral promises.
  Second, the uncertainty and inconsistency instigated by EU’s structural problems 
may have distorted BiH’s reform efforts. Belloni (2009: 324-5) raises concerns about 
the EU strategy that there are persistent internal divisions both among EU member 
states and within European institutions, pointing out that ‘EU member states often 
struggle to maintain a semblance of unity’ in key issues (e.g. further enlargement and 
the recognition of Kosovo’s status). Despite the rhetoric of partnership, the execution 
of EU policies is still ‘visibly top-down’ (ibid.: 326). A part of EU conditionality 
towards the West Balkans involves the requirement of ‘full cooperation’ with the 
ICTY. In practice, this meant that the ICTY and its chief prosecutor became the de 
facto ‘gatekeepers’ in the process of European integration10. The lack of clarity about 
the respective responsibilities of the EU and ICTY in ascertaining compliance created 
an impression of indecisiveness. As such Belloni calls for a clear division of 
responsibilities between the technical/practical requirements to assess the degree of 
cooperation with international penal institutions and the task of elaborating a political 
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strategy. In this regard, EU foreign policy institutions, the ICTY, the Stability Pact and 
the SAP could all be criticised for their excessive attentions to BiH political leadership 
which polarised between Europeanised elites and non-Europeanised and alienated 
citizens. 
  In addition, the long term timeframe of accession process and inconsistent 
application of conditionality complicate the short term local endorsement of reforms, 
because local leaders need to deliver tangible results to their constituencies to push 
through tough reforms. In late 2007, for example, Bosnian authorities accepted a 
(revised) reform agenda package as a result of the EU’s decision to authorise the 
SAA. However, the ICTY’s demand of the ‘5-plus-2’ objectives/conditions and the 
European Court of Human Rights judgements served effectively as additional 
membership criteria on top of the package (Anastasakis 2008)11. For BiH side, the 
goal of its EU membership turned into a ‘moving target’ (Bechev 2006: 39)12. The 
inconsistency is found, for example, in the accession experience of Bulgaria and 
Romania. The two states were allowed to join the EU in 2007 without doing enough 
to tackle organised crime and corruption, although they had been held to much higher 
standards (MacDonald and Buckley 2011). It appears to be an obvious double 
standard for Bosnians who face the same condition; and such inconsistency can 
reasonably generate moral hazard within BiH’s reform efforts.
  Third, Bosnia’s unique conditions may have undermined the applicability of the 
uniformed EU approach. According to Belloni (2009), EU-induced, action-oriented 
reforms and instruments have long been anticipated to fail to address key BiH-specific 
problems, in particular the need to develop state and region-wide institutions. Due to 
the country’s post-conflict status, the acquis communautaire and political 
conditionality (i.e. acquis démocratique), on which the EU’s entire policy framework 
relies, are regularly contested. The conditionality-based Europeanisation process has 
been unable to alter domestic political actors’ behaviour and to promote consensus 
(Domm 2011). 
  Aybet (2010: 32) argues that the process of norm compliance in traditional 
conditionality literature is not applicable to post-conﬂict states in which central state-
level institutions are weak and there is very little consensus at the elite level about the 
contours of the new state. Indeed there have been successful cases in central and 
eastern Europe in which externally induced state building through conditionality 
worked for EU enlargements. The primary contribution to the successes was the 
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domestic ownership of state transformation which allowed the accession processes to 
be driven in mutually (i.e. Brussels and counterpart states) cooperative manner. In 
contrast, the Bosnian case shows that conditionality works very differently in post-
conﬂict societies—if not hardly (ibid.: 21)1314.
3.6. Fluctuations and compromises in EU approach
The EU policies and approaches have not necessarily been consistent as mentioned 
previously. The compromise in the police reform has further damaged the credibility 
of EU conditionality. At the final stage of the SAA negotiation in April 2008, it stalled 
due to a disagreement over the prolonged, controversial police reform. The EU 
conceded its position substantially and watered down the centralisation aspect of the 
police system, putting the adaptation of the SAA before the effectiveness of the 
reform. Domm (2011) explains three factors for the compromise. First, there was a 
shared belief between the both parties that the SAA would be essential to realising the 
political and economic security of EU territories and Balkan region. Second, as the 
regional hegemony, the EU might have faced blames from the international 
community in case the EU failed to bear the responsibility (i.e. non-success in the 
SAA negotiation with BiH). And third, the six month term of EU chairmanship makes 
every chair country tend to seek for tangible, short term achievements. In 2005 
afterwards, EU politicians had been optimistic about pushing reforms and other short 
term fixes in BiH and hence about making a signal of a ‘decisive break’ with the past. 
However, continual raising and dashing unrealistic expectations have contributed to a 
sense of instability and pessimism in chair countries and have lead to frustration in 
Brussels. The rotating EU Presidency may have added a structural dimension to this 
issue.
  The police reform was not the only compromise by the EU. In March 2000, Brussels 
presented a Road Map which sketched out eighteen steps to be taken by BiH to 
qualify for a Feasibility Study for the SSA. The Map told BiH to strengthen the state 
institution by establishing a state treasury, ensuring funding for the State Border 
Service and removing all trade barriers between the entities. The Map, however, faced 
resistances from the Serb and Croat political parties. They tried to keep the state-level 
institutions as weak as possible, whereas the Bosniac and multi-ethnic political parties 
wanted to concentrate responsibilities at the state level. The EU initially expected the 
Map's conditions to be fulfilled within six months; but saw no significant progress. 
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However, only a few days before the elections in October 2002, the EU assessed the 
Map as ‘substantially completed’ (Commission of the European Communities 2003: 5; 
Hadikaduni 2005). Subsequently in November 2003, the EU’s Feasibility Study 
demanded significant progresses in sixteen priorities as the precondition for the SAA 
negotiation. The priorities included realisation of a ‘single’ economic space (i.e. 
streamlining the varying regulations between entities) as well as the structural reform 
of the police (Commission of the European Communities 2003). The series of 
negotiations illustrates how easily Brussels has watered down the conditions for 
Bosnia's SAA (followed by renewed requirements, though). It reasonably appears to 
Bosnians that the conditions for EU membership can be ﬂexible, if not 
inconsequential (McMahon and Western 2009).
  Despite these setbacks, there is ‘a marked difference in the way international 
institutions have … approached their roles in Bosnia’s state building process’ (Aybet 
2010: 22-3). The EU (and NATO as well) have moved away from the interventionist, 
top-down approach exhibited in the Bonn Powers to a softer process of guidance and 
persuasion. Aybet explains that this move was largely driven by the conclusions of the 
Venice Commission report in 2005 (European Commission for Democracy through 
Law 2005), which calls for a reduction of the interventionist role of external actors as 
the only way to create effective state institutions and domestic state building. In part, 
this can be considered as a realistic evaluation of the past dismal record of imposing 
reforms with deadlines (which ended up generating antagonism among domestic 
parties against the EU and its approach).
  The author’s research trip to Sarajevo in September 2011 has also confirmed the shift 
of EU approach ‘from imposition to facilitation’—that is, although Brussels does set 
policy targets, it places no definite deadlines but ‘waits for the BiH side to arrive’15. 
The accession process will not advance unless BiH clears the targets; but the EU 
spares no assistance to that end. This may be an indication that Brussels no longer 
scrambles to realise BiH’s accession; it can be as late as Kosovo’s. If so, it is a drastic 
policy shift. In the past the EU conceded even in the vital police reform—which 
represented the union’s emphasis on ‘soft power’, giving prominence to conﬁdence 
building activities—so that BiH’s accession process could proceed to the next step. 
The EU’s shift, if any, might be a reflection of the ‘enlargement fatigue’ (MacDonald 
and Buckley 2011). They argue that the union have been suffering from fatigue after 
admitting twelve members in 2004 and 2007, and that the current Eurozone financial 
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problems have exacerbated the fatigue by making the biggest states wary of admitting 
small, weak economies.
  This can be an opportunity to alter BiH’s past resistance-oriented attitude. Belloni 
(2009: 322) is optimistic that the European perspective has the potential to achieve 
further reforms without the blatant top-down, social engineering tools frequently 
adopted by international actors. However, the failure of High Representative Schwarz-
Schilling’s minimalist ‘local ownership’ approach in 2006-07 period suggests that 
Belloni’s presumption may not be materialised instantly16. Rather, there is a risk that 
the accession process would end up being a ‘waiting game’ in which Sarajevo expects 
another EU shift to more proactive stance, judged from Brussels’ past record of 
fluctuations. 
4. SAA: A ROAD MAP TO EU MEMBERSHIP
The BiH government and the EU signed the SAA and IA on 16 June 2008 in 
Luxembourg. As previously mentioned, SAAs are designed for the Western Balkans 
and are important components of the SAP, a formal contractual relationship between 
the signatories, and the European Neighbourhood Policy17. SAAs are based mostly on 
the EU's acquis communautaire, and must be ratified by the associating state and all 
EU member states. The SAA provides that most Bosnian products are subject to zero 
tariff in EU market, while Bosnian side is to gradually open its market to EU 
counterpart in five years. BiH will also introduce EU standards, progressively aligning 
its legislation in areas of competition, intellectual property, investment, public 
procurement and protection of personal data. 
  The SAA is regarded as the first step before BiH’s application to the EU membership 
by which Brussels formally grants BiH a status as a candidate country. Upon the 
signature, the EU’s Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn remarked ‘[T]he entering 
into force of this Agreement is a further proof of the EU's commitment to the 
European perspective of BiH. It will enhance economic development in the country. 
Its successful implementation is the gateway to candidate status’ (EC 2008).
  The accession to the EU (including the provisions of the SAA/IA) is expected to 
bring about number of benefits to BiH. The EU accession is broadly supported in 
BiH. In a 2009 opinion survey 66 percent of the population considered EU 
membership as a good thing; the mean respondent believed that Bosnia would join the 
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EU in 2022 (Gallup Balkan Monitor 2009). But on the other, all the major political 
parties have been careful not to say what sacrifices they are ready to make, while they 
have expressed their support for integration into the EU (Juncos 2005).
4.1. Immediate benefits of SAA and EU integration for BiH
The immediate advantages for accession countries can be summarised as financial 
support from Brussels, legal-bonded access to EU markets (and visa-free entrance to 
the Schengen area) as well as security and political stability. It will be also expected to 
encourage political and economic reforms in institution building, public 
administration, respect of human rights and the rule of law. 
  According to the World Bank (2007) calculation, the EU has given BiH about EUR 
2.6 billion in financial assistance between 1991 and 2006. In the immediate post-war 
years funds were largely directed to refugee programmes and reconstruction projects, 
handled by the EU’s humanitarian aid organisation. Since 2001 BiH has been a 
beneficially of the Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and 
Stabilisation (CARDS) programme, with the forcus shifting from on post-war 
assistance to institutional capacity building and economic development18. Under the 
CARDS in 2001-06 years, the total EU assistance to BiH amounted EUR 600 million. 
Subsequently the EU has adopted a new financial aid mechanism, the Instrument for 
Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), to streamline the different external aid components, 
to facilitate coherence and to improve consistency, replacing all previous external 
assistance programmes for candidate and potential candidate countries. The IPA 
covers the period 2007-13; the projected IPA volume for BiH amounts to EUR 550 
million for 2007-12 period19. The IPA extends its cover to the areas of the rule of law, 
human rights, social inclusion and the protection of minorities as well as to the 
reforms in climate change, the media sector, public administration, the judiciary, 
unemployment, education and public health systems20.
  Even before the SAA signature, the majority of BiH products could entre the EU 
market duty-free by a preferential trade regime adopted in 2000 (which has expired in 
2010 but reinstated in December 2011 for 4 years for all Western Balkans). By the 
SAA provision of free trade arrangement, the relative price competitiveness of 
Bosnian products will increase in the EU market. This opens opportunities for BiH to 
attract investments targeting the EUR 12.2 trillion market—which can contribute to 
addressing the high unemployment (particularly younger generations), to diversifying 
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the economic structure and to upgrading the BiH economy. In addition, the SAA 
provides BiH nationals visa-free entrance to the Schengen area. This has been the 
frequent demand of Sarajevo to address the high level of unemployment (Juncos 
2005; Belloni 2009)21.
  The accession can also archieve political stability and security. The EU shares this 
for its own benefit. McMahon and Western (2009) argue that BiH’s geographical 
location ‘prevents them from being ignored by their wealthy neighbours [in the west] 
… a luxury that most conﬂict-ridden countries do not have’. The literature agrees that 
good relations with neighbours (i.e. the Balkan countries) through regional 
cooperation and deeper integration into the EU enhance stability and security. Gromes 
(2009: 437) argues that the prospect of EU integration has a role of discouraging the 
domestic extremists and secessionists, generating an increased acceptance of BiH as a 
common state of Bosniacs, Serbs and Croats. Brussels signals the Serb and Croat 
politicians in BiH that only acceptance of the common state would pave the way to an 
EU membership. They came to be aware that they were ‘too small not to be a part of 
something undisputable’. In addition, by opening the prospect of EU memberships for 
Croatia and Serbia, the EU gave these countries an incentive to put up with the 
territorial integrity of BiH. In fact the policy changes in these neighbour states 
weakened the secessionist agendas in BiH. After the nationalistic HDZ (Croatian 
Democratic Union) party in Croatia had lost power in the elections in 2000, the new 
government changed policy towards BiH. In BiH, the OHR and the peacekeeping 
mission tackled illegal, ethnic exclusive power structures of the BiH political parties 
of SDS (Serb Democratic Party), (Bosnian) HDZ and Bosniac SDA (Party of 
Democratic Action), and blocked the option of the country’s partition. With these 
regional and domestic developments, the institutions prescribed by the Dayton 
Accords gained relevance, and the conflict parties had to recognise that ‘BiH was a 
fact’.
  As evidenced in the cases of Mexico in the North American Free Trade Agreement 
and of Egypt under the European Neighbourhood Policy, regional cooperation and 
integration arrangement can create a 'policy lock-in' effect that member states are 
obliged to pursue policy measures stipulated in arrangement treaties (Watanabe 2007). 
This is particularly effective in economic reforms and relevant to BiH, because the 
country’s socialist regulations can be liberalised with EU’s incentives (e.g. loans from 
the Council of Europe Development Bank and European Investment Bank). 
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4.2. Issues and limits in SAA implementation
Bechev (2006: 38-9) argues that the EU sees free trade as an initial step in a longer 
term process. The SAA, like other institutional frameworks between the EU and 
neighbouring accession countries, provides for cooperation in terms of labour and 
capital mobility, reciprocal rights of business establishment and liberalisation of the 
trade in services. To make the regional cooperation and integration in the West 
Balkans viable (i.e. a common economic space under uniform rules of the game), the 
BiH-EU integration arrangement has to go beyond mere zero tariff; regional 
integration has figured amongst the goals further down the road22. Joseph and 
Hitchner (2008) also point out that the EU accession process puts onuses on the 
candidate countries to come up with their own solutions, not to depend on outside 
actors. This is the primary benefit of the SAA, forcing Bosnians to take ownership 
over their affairs, while eliminating debilitating dependency on the international 
community, especially the OHR. For instance, the Eastern Bloc transition countries 
acquired confidence in the ability of their political systems to develop vital 
institutional bargaining skills and to produce compromise in the course of their EU 
accession.
  When it comes to BiH, however, such development appears to be a distant goal. 
Although there is a shared view that EU accession is the national priority, it does not 
narrow the gap between the competing political parties; no significant bargaining (like 
the experience observed in other accession countries) appears to take place. Rather, as 
evidenced in the police reform case, EU accession remains ‘secondary to the aim of 
preserving or even advancing the relative power of one’s own group’ (ibid.: 6). And 
the EU’s compromise may have constituted moral hazard within BiH to pursue reform 
agendas for EU accession23.
  More importantly, the SAA does not necessarily address the structural problems to 
achieve a longer term stability in BiH. Joseph and Hitchner stress that the SAA was 
not designed to resolve ethnic conflict or to address the dysfunctional constitutional 
structure (while it involves some transfer of powers from the entities to the state). For 
example, the full EU membership and associated investment and development have 
not worked out in the impasse between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Although the 
acquis communautaire is an unparalleled spur to democratic reforms representing the 
union’s ‘soft power’, the reforms do not directly address the minority rights or provide 
human rights protections, let alone the divisions embedded in the post-conflict 
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country. It is naïve to consider the SAA as a panacea indeed. With acknowledging this 
limitation, the next section examines positive implications especially to economic 
perspectives.
4.3. The meaning of EU integration effort for BiH
For the BiH to make an internationally competitive economy and realise sustainable 
growth, the ongoing reform agendas have to be pursued not merely to meet the 
conditions for EU integration. The tariff-free access to the EU market should help BiH 
exports in theory. However, this advantage may not necessarily be materialised due to 
non-tariff barriers. The EU applies a variety of standards in the areas of food hygiene, 
environment and sanitary, among others. Under the absence of EU-compliant food 
safety institutions or regulatory framework in BiH, a broad range of its products 
remains banned from EU markets (World Bank 2011b). Take agricultural products. 
McMahon and Western (2009) illustrate by an example that Serb farmers in the RS 
who grow high quality organic fruits and vegetables cannot sell these lucrative 
products in the EU market because BiH does not have a centralised agriculture 
ministry which would have issued certificates to prove that the farmers’ fruits and 
vegetables meet the required EU standards. BiH has duly established a state level 
Food Safety Agency, a Plant Health and Phytosanitary Agency and a Veterinary 
Office; and relating regulation has been developed. However, no sufficient agreement 
has been reached on precise demarcation of roles and responsibilities between various 
organisations as well as on the link to entity inspection services. Nor have laws and 
regulations been adopted and implemented. Currently such certificates can be 
obtained in Zagreb, Croatia, but costing EUR 25,000 per product24. 
Table 5. BiH trading partners: 2010
Km 000’s
Exports % Imports %
EU Countries 3 869.91 54.5 6 251.5 45.9
o/w Austria 489.083 6.9 489.1 3.6
Italy 862.022 12.1 1 210.4 8.9
Germany 1 085.936 15.3 1 425.0 10.5
Slovenia 611.744 8.6 808.9 5.9
Montenegro 310.18 4.4 44.5 0.3
Croatia 1 070.625 15.1 2 058.9 15.1
Macedonia FYR 69.971 1.0 137.3 1.0
Serbia 894.775 12.6 1 429.5 10.5
Others 880.042 12.4 3 694.5 27.1
TOTAL 7 095.503 100.0 13 616.2 100.0
Source: Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina (2011)
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  Table 5 shows that the EU accounts for 54.5 percent of the destination of BiH 
exports in 2010. The BiH exporters to the EU are largely represented by some large 
scale enterprises (e.g. alumina factories) which can absorb such administrative cost to 
meet the EU standards. No doubt, however, the cost is beyond the capacity for small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs) and farmers.  
  The problem is not confined to the trade with the EU. The existing trade of SMEs 
and farmers with the neighbours will be shortly affected as well. For example, when 
Croatia enters the EU in July 2013, BiH exporters face the very EU boundary (which 
is currently prohibiting Bosnian farm products to entre) just next to them, and they 
have to comply with the EU standards to maintain their business. Croatia (technically) 
requires similar standards to BiH products even now, but the regulatory authority may 
Table 6. Main destinations of BiH merchandise export: 2010
Km 000’s
Country Total Food & liveanimals
Beverages
& tobacco
Crude materials,
inedible, exc.
fuels
Mineral fuels,
lubricants, &
related.
Germany 1 086.0 8.0 1.2 109.9 16.7
Croatia 1 070.6 123.6 26.2 80.9 244.2
Serbia 894.8 78.9 10.0 88.9 387.6
Italy 862.0 28.8 12.0 102.0 16.6
Slovenia 611.7 15.8 2.4 165.0 12.1
Austria 470.6 38.6 175.0 70.1 10.1
Montenegro 310.2 21.9 5.5 94.1 89.3
Switzerland 160.4 4.1 0.2 5.0 121.3
Hungary 126.1 1.5 0 21.7 1.0
France 87.0 3.8 0.5 1.0 1.4
Turkey 81.7 26.8 0.4 10.5 0.6
Netherlands 80.8 0.9 0.2 5.5 2.6
Country
Animal &
vegetable
oils, fats &
waxes
Chemicals
& related
products
Manufact
ured
goods
Machinery &
transport
equipment
Misc.
manufactured
articles
Germany 7.7 15.7 216.0 143.6 567.1
Croatia 24.5 28.7 406.3 43.8 92.5
Serbia 5.3 38.8 192.4 47.6 45.3
Italy 43.0 68.6 279.3 52.5 314.0
Slovenia 7.6 8.7 78.9 249.6 71.2
Austria 4.9 8.5 92.4 96.8 149.0
Montenegro 0.5 8.3 64.1 12.6 13.8
Switzerland n.a. 0.9 5.8 2.9 20.1
Hungary 0.5 9.7 71.9 8.9 10.9
France n.a. 0.2 24.1 12.9 43.3
Turkey n.a. 9.0 27.3 6.8 1.0
Netherlands 0.0 3.6 21.0 13.6 33.6
Note: SITC Rev.4 sections
Source: Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina (2011)
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apply standards more strictly—otherwise they face Brussels’ penalties. As in Table 6, 
the BiH exports to Croatia (KM 1.07 million) is almost as much as the ones to 
Germany (KM 1.08 million). More importantly, ‘Food & live animals’ (KM 123.6 
thousand) is one of the main BiH exports to Croatia. If the unofficial, small scale 
cross-border trade by rural farmers is also taken into consideration, the implication of 
Croatia’s stricter application of standards to BiH farm and SME products are 
significant.
  The BiH government should have fixed its trade regimes before the EU’s preferential 
treatment expired in 2010. As the Croatia’s EU accession becomes a matter of reality, 
BiH government is finally becoming aware of this issue. For BiH economy to be self-
reliant, the promotion of export sector is a pressing issue under the situation in which 
low technology and labour intensive manufacturing sector has been hit by Chinese 
competitors. Although it is no doubt important to exploit the potentiality of EU 
market, the defence of the existing markets in neighbouring countries is critical to BiH 
economy and employment. 
  The EU’s IPA does have an assistance menu for BiH government to establish testing 
and inspection laboratories with equipment and technical assistance. However, the 
politicians’ bargain between state and entities prevents the assistance to be executed at 
the de facto expense of farmers and SMEs. Needless to mention, the neighbours’ EU 
accessions proceed regardless of BiH’s progress. In this respect, the reforms are 
indispensable for BiH economy no matter how EU’s conditions are demanding.
5. CONCLUSION
The development of EU accession processes in the Western Balkan region conveys a 
different sense of BiH’s reforms. The reforms are no longer reluctant burden or matter 
of bargain for an EU membership with trying to gauge Brussels' moods. As the 
neighbouring countries’ integration to the EU becomes a reality, the reforms are 
inevitable for BiH to increase the economy’s competitiveness to serve a twofold 
objective—competing with the products of the accession countries in the EU market 
and preserving the existing markets in the neighbours. There is skepticism in BiH to 
wonder what tangible beneﬁts an EU membership would provide in the midst of the 
worldwide economic downturn at the expense of the politically painful reforms. 
Nevertheless, it appears that BiH has no choice but to pursue the reforms regardless 
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of an EU membership, and cannot waste time to wait for the day of accession, if any. 
An EU membership for BiH deserves an alternative translation—that is, a 
consequence of the reform efforts rather than an aim. 
  The compliance with EU standards is not a mere technical issue in trade facilitation. 
The neighbouring countries would strictly require products coming from BiH to 
comply with EU standards to avoid penalties by Brussels and protect their domestic 
competitors. For this, BiH exporters will have to inevitably comply with the standards 
to exploit the advantage of tariff-free entrance to the EU market and to maintain the 
existing business with the neighbours. This involves political agreements between the 
parties divided in ethnic lines in BiH to manage the testing and inspection operations. 
As such the seemingly minor technical issue has significant implications to BiH’s 
political process. In this regard, a regional perspective deserves more attention in 
investigating the issues in BiH’s political economy and EU accession.
  However, there is a risk of moral hazard that Sarajevo underrates the EU conditions 
owing to the EU’s past record of inconsistent policies and compromises: ‘Brussels 
may let us join in the end of the day, even if the required conditions would not be met 
in full’. This can be a potential impediment for BiH’s determination, if any, to pursue 
politically difficult reforms. The progress of reform agendas under the HR Ashdown 
period suggests that the EU’s proactive, interventionist approach may want to be re-
evaluated to avoid a ‘waiting game’ and to press reforms. 
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1  See Worldwide Governance Indicators and the Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perception Index at <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_chart.asp> and <http://www.
transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi>, respectively.
2  In March 2005, the Venice Commission set out a range of constitutional reforms needed to 
make Bosnia compatible with European standards as precondition for the country to gain 
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candidate status of an EU membership. These included: i) transfer of competencies from the 
entities to the state; ii) reform of inefficient state legislative and executive structures; iii) 
elimination of ‘prerogatives for ethnic or group right’; iv) strengthening citizens’ rights; and v) 
clarification of the entities’ future relationship to the state (Joseph and Hitchner 2008).
3  The police reform is a good example of the problem, and has been one of the key (and most 
controversial) conditions for BiH towards an EU membership. The issue has already been 
discussed in the literature so that no further discussion is needed in the context of this article. 
See Collantes Celador (2009) for details of the police reform.
4  See Table A1 in the Annex for the compendium of SAP structure.
5  The Pact was structured as an international coordination body for civilian aid. It aimed at 
developing a partnership between international and local actors and at creating the conditions 
for effective local ownership of the post-Yugoslav/post-war transition process. The SAP 
conditionality involves several steps, including the establishment of a Consultative Taskforce, 
the drafting of a Feasibility Study on a SAA and the negotiation and ratiﬁcation of the 
Agreement—which in turn opens the way for an application for EU membership. The SAP has 
put a strong emphasis on regional cooperation. First, the readiness to engage in bilateral and 
multilateral cooperative schemes has been singled out as an essential condition for obtaining an 
associate status with the EU. Second, EU’s assistance programme, the CARDS adopted in 
2000, contains a pronounced regional cooperation element. It focused on the areas of i) 
multilateral trade facilitation measures, ii) infrastructure development and air-control 
cooperation, iii) the environment and iv) statistical cooperation. See EC (2001) for the details of 
the CARDS.
6  See <http://www.eupm.org/OurMandate.aspx>.
7  Bechev (2006) argues that EU policies to south-east Europe (SEE) has fluctuated. Brussels 
was initially reluctant to the enlargement, focusing more on deepening the union following the 
1992 Maastricht agenda. Its policy change took place at the 1993 Copenhagen Summit in which 
the membership criteria (so-called the Copenhagen Criteria) were laid down for the candidate 
states. However, the judgment for membership would be bilateral basis rather than regional 
arrangement basis, despite the EU’s primary policy to promote the latter. This bilateralism 
became the guiding principle for SEE and has helped the EU to exert its ‘normative’ power. The 
Kosovo crisis made Brussels to reconsider the strategy and required regional cooperation in 
SEE as in the Stability Pact. See this for the EU accession criteria, <http://ec.europa.eu/
enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/criteria/index_en.htm>.
8  Kelly (2004) identifies the conditions by which external pressures can function. Membership 
conditionality on the one hand and persuasion and social influence on the other are not effective 
when they are used alone. The former is often much less sensitive to domestic opposition than 
is efforts in the latter. External agents (e.g. international organisations) could change policy in 
target countries with membership conditionality, whereas socialisation-based efforts only really 
worked when the domestic opposition was quite low or if ethnic minorities themselves had 
bargaining power in the government. The BiH case lacks the critical condition for the both 
approaches to function.
9  During the author’s research trip to Sarajevo in September 2011, an interviewee of BiH 
official confessed that external pressure by the US and the EU would be needed to break 
through the political deadlock. For more than a year from the October 2010 elections, a state 
level government coalition had not been formed. The RS formed its government in January 
2011. The Federation did so in March 2011 after the electoral victory of a coalition lead by the 
Social Democratic Party. But the continued impasse within the Federation among political 
parties claiming to represent ethnic Croats threatened to deepen ethnic politics and delayed an 
agreement at the State level (World Bank 2011b). The problem finally settled in December 2011 
and the state government has been formed.
10  The current prosecutor is Serge Brammertz, while Belloni (2009) may be thinking of Carla 
Del Ponte (1999–2007) at the time of his writing.
11  See <www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=41874> for the 5 plus 2 objectives/conditions.
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12  One reaction to such moving target can be found in RS, for example, that the day after the 
2005 French referendum on the EU constitution, the RS Parliament rejected once again the 
police reform package.
13  Simic (2001) further claims that even ‘post-conflict’ cannot wholly characterise the countries 
in the region, but they have diverse conditions and different institutional relations with the EU. 
Hence he questions that whether the concept of ‘Balkan’ as a whole can stand. This diversity 
has made it difficult to construct a single regional integration strategy for the South-east Europe 
for the EU.
14  Aybet (2010) points out that the processes of conditionality in the literature do not explain 
why the two entities in Bosnia complied with the defence reform upon the NATO’s 
conditionality. She, while being careful not to mix up the security with governance issues, 
argues that the correct sequence (regardless it is deliberate or not) has made the defence reform 
being one of the few successful reforms in BiH in the situation where state-building and state 
transformation through the accession process occurred in tandem. Or, the success could be 
simply ascribed to HR Ashdown’s tough exertion of the Bonn Powers. The validity of Aybet’s 
account is subject to further examinations.
15  The research trip in September 2010 interviewed the anonymous officials of the BiH 
Government in charge of EU integration and economic planning, diplomatic missions including 
the European Commission and Japan as well as the United Nations organisations.
16  Under HR Schwarz-Schilling period, it became clear that BiH politicians were not going to 
meet reform expectations to allow the OHR to close and grant BiH an EU candidate status 
(Chivvis 2010).
17  The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), as a part of the EU’s security strategy, is 
intended to maintain relations with the neighbouring countries in Eastern Europe, the Southern 
Mediterranean and the Southern Caucasus where EU accession is not in prospect. The ENP was 
introduced in 2003 to avoid the divisions between the countries of EU accession and of the 
ENP. See <http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/neighbourhood_policy_en.htm>.
18  Key target areas of the CARDS for BiH were in line with the EU’s conditions in SAP—
public administration reform (e.g. customs and taxations), justice and home affairs (i.e. police 
restructuring, border management and judicial reform) and improvement of investment climate 
(e.g. trade, education, environment and infrastructure).
19  The European Commission announced in December 2011 that EUR 200 million would be 
disbursed for BiH for 2012/13 fiscal year under the IPA scheme. See this for EU assistance to 
BiH, <http://www.delbih.ec.europa.eu/?akcija=clanak&CID=23&jezik=2&LID=33> and 
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/potential-candidates/bosnia_and_herzegovina/financial-
assistance/index_en.htm>.
20  Bechev (2006: 35) stresses that the size matters. Perceptions about the level of EU 
involvement mattered as much as the financial contributions. While the Stability Pact was 
formally placed under the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s umbrella, all 
SEE governments saw it as an EU instrument and judged its performance not only by looking at 
how much fresh money it was drawing to the region, but also how much it advanced political 
and economic ties with the EU. The beneficiary states were eager to show that they were 
eligible for membership on the basis of their commitment to the EU values.
21  Free trade arrangements with the EU and other accession countries can confound the already-
substantial trade deficit of BiH. The implication would be significant to the uncompetitive 
manufacturing sector, while the food/agricultural sector may see less negative impacts than 
industry sector. The main food exporters (mainly the neighbouring countries) have already had 
free access to BiH market thanks to the bilateral and regional trade arrangement such as the 
Central European Free Trade Agreement (Table A2).
22  Even regional integration among SEE countries itself is not necessarily viewed as ideal for 
advanced SEE members. Bechev (2006: 39) points out that although the Stability Pact induces 
the SEE states to liberalise their mutual trade, the treaty-bound integration arrangement is seen 
as alarming by particular governments, e.g. Croatia. In 2000–01, its leaders voiced strong 
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criticisms on some prominent Western figures like George Soros and German Foreign Minister 
Joschka Fischer for their suggestions of establishing a Balkan customs union. Zagreb felt that 
such arrangement could lock the country firmly in the group of SEE ‘backwater’ states/
territories (e.g. BiH) and undermine its chances to narrow the gap with the then EU candidate 
states.
23  Although the SAA was ratified by all EU states in February 2011, its entry into force was 
frozen at the time of this writing, since BiH was still not complying with a part of the 
obligations for the SAA. (The IA has been into effect in July 2008.) The obligations include i) 
the adoption of state laws on state aids, ii) the national census and iii) the implementation of the 
Finci and Sejdic ruling of the European Court of Human Rights requiring an amendment to the 
BiH Constitution to allow minorities to be elected within the Presidency and to gain seats in the 
House of Peoples. RS opposes the three issues insisting that they are exclusively entity matters. 
For the Finci and Sejdic ruling, see the Court’s web site at <http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/
view.asp?action=html&documentId=860268&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&ta
ble=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649>.
24  Author’s interview with an anonymous BiH government official.
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APPENDIX
Table A1. Stabilisation and Association Process
Aims and target countries of SAP
- stabilising the West Balkan countries and encouraging their swift transition to a market economy
-  promoting regional cooperation between SAP countries, EU and candidates for EU membership 
in central Europe
- building capacity of SAP countries to adopt EU laws & standards for future EU membership
1
(Conclusion of) SAA
Three Components of SAP
2
EU financial assistance
3
Autonomous trade 
measures
SAA & Interim Agreement
-  Bilateral treaty between 
SAP countries and EU
-  Provides gradual 
implementation of a free 
trade area and reforms 
(e.g. competition and 
state aid rules, 
intellectual property) 
with benchmarks (as 
obligation to SAP 
countries)
-  prerequisite for any 
further assessment by 
EU of a SAP country’s 
prospects of EU 
accession
CARDS (2000-06)
-  Streamlined various EU aid schemes to 
West Balkans
-  4 objectives
1.  reconstruction, democratic stabilisation, 
reconciliation, return of refugees
2.  institutional & legislative development for 
harmonisation with EU norms (e.g. 
democracy, rule of law, human rights, 
civil society, free market economy)
3.  economic & social development
4.  promotion of regional cooperation as 
above
IPA (2007-)
-  Replaces CARDS with a more flexible 
financial instrument with 5 components:
1.  support for transition & institution-building;
2.  cross-border cooperation
3.  regional development: support 
implementation of EU-cohesion policy
4.  human resources development
5.  rural development: concerns EU common 
agricultural-related policies
Trade concessions
(until 2010)
-  Allow SAP countries 
duty free access to 
the EU market
-  Intended to stimulate 
exports to EU and 
FDI to SAP countries
Source: Author
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Table A2. Main origins of BiH merchandise import: 2010*
Country Total (Km 000’s) Main imports
Croatia
Serbia
Germany
Italy
Russia
Slovenia
China
Austria
U.S.
Hungary
2 058.9
1 429.5
1 425.0
1 210.4
1 189.1
808.9
655.5
489.1
485.5
416.8
Mineral fuels, lubricants, & related.
Food & live animals; Manufactured goods
Machinery & transport equipment; Manufactured goods
Manufactured goods
Mineral fuels, lubricants, & related.
Manufactured goods; Machinery & transport equipment
Machinery & transport equipment; Misc. manufactured articles
Manufactured goods; Machinery & transport equipment
Mineral fuels, lubricants, & related.
Food & live animals; Mineral fuels, lubricants, & related.
Note: SITC Rev.4 sections
Source: Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina (2011)
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